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I. Introduction 
Numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) contain provisions imposing human 
rights-related obligations, particularly in the case of agreements between the Eu-
ropean Union and a developing country (often a former colony). Such obligations 
often consist of hortatory "best endeavors" language rather than legally binding 
provisions. Even the small number of provisions that are binding are very rarely 
enforced. Furthermore, even if an FTA features human rights-related provisions, 
it may contain other terms that have negative implications for human rights. 
Thus, including human rights provisions in FTAs will not necessarily result in 
better human rights outcomes. There are additional reasons to be cautious about 
the potential for FTAs to improve the circumstances of developing countries. 
There is an inherent inequality in FTA negotiations between developed and de-
veloping countries. And trade agreements vary significantly in the degree to 
which they provide for financial, technical, logistical, and other forms of assis-
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tance to their developing country participants. Indeed, there has been a recent 
trend towards negotiating FTAs and other trade agreements amongst predomi-
nantly developed countries. These agreements tend to focus on achieving com-
mitments to liberalize trade more deeply and broadly than that to which the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership as a whole would be likely to 
agree. Such "high standard" agreements do not make many, if any, provisions for 
particularized needs or different capabilities of developing countries. It is there-
fore not surprising that such agreements and negotiations have no least-devel-
oped country (LDC)i or poorer developing country participants. Given the 
unfavorable bargaining power developing countries face in FTA negotiations 
with developed country partners and the trend towards negotiating FTAs that are 
not well-aligned with poorer countries' interests, FTAs may not be a suitable 
forum for addressing human rights-related concerns. 
Furthermore, even though the European Union's FTAs among others contain 
human rights clauses, such FTAs by and large do not include the countries with 
the worst human rights abuses. While human rights violations occur in all coun-
tries, there is a significant correlation between level of economic development 
and such abuses. 2 The countries that are considered to have the highest levels of 
corruption and human rights abuses are not, by and large, participating in FTAs 
or other reciprocal trade agreements, at least in part because they are not mem-
bers of the WTO. While the WTO is not a panacea for developing countries, it 
may provide the better space - as compared to FTAs - for achieving objectives 
in furtherance of human rights objectives. 
This article begins in Part II with a brief discussion of the historical debates 
over human rights and trade linkage and the practice of including human rights 
provisions in FTAs. Part HI identifies a number of concerns regarding the inclu-
sion of human rights obligations in FTAs, including the fact that FTAs rarely 
include the worst human rights offenders. Part IV then argues that it may be 
preferable - and more fruitful - to promote human rights by bringing the worst 
culprits into the WTO, and details some of the ways human rights concerns can 
be promoted through the WTO and membership therein. Part V then concludes. 
I "LDC" is the term the United Nations uses to refer to countries it has identified as being low-
income and suffering from severe structural obstacles to sustainable development. The criteria used to 
determine LDC status includes gross national income per capita; a human asset index; and an economic 
vulnerability index. There are presently 48 countries classified as LDCs. See What are least developed 
countries (LDCs)?, UNIID NATIONS (last visited Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/ 
desa/policy/cdp/ldcjinfo.shtml. 
2 Indeed, the denial of economic opportunity can be seen as a direct violation of human rights. See 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). However, 
economic rights are often seen as "second generation" rights that are a lower priority than "first genera-
tion" civil and political rights. See, e.g., Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA J. 
lrrr' L L. 589, 605 and n.42 (1996); see also Makau Mutua, Human Rights and Powerlessness:Patholo-
gies of Choice and Substance, 56 BuiF. L. Riiv. 1027, 1028 (2008) ("[Tlhere has never been a major 
human rights NGO in the West that focuses on economic, social, and cultural rights. The problem is not 
simply one oforientation, but a fundamental philosophical commitment by movement scholars and activ-
ists to vindicate 'core' political and civil rights [over other types of rights] . . . ."). 
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II. Trade and Human Rights - To Link or Not to Link? 
There has been a lengthy debate within academia and the GATT/WTO mem-
bership regarding the linkage or lack thereof between trade and human rights, 
and to what degree any such linkage should be formalized within the GATT/ 
WTO. 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann has long argued that international trade governance 
in the WTO should be "constitutionalized" in conformity with Members' human 
rights obligations and that the right to trade should be seen as a human right.3 
While many ascribe to Petersmann's views, his position has also been subject to 
numerous critiques.4 
Disagreement remains over whether human rights should be written more ex-
plicitly into the WTO Agreements. However, views have evolved such that it is 
now much more common to see commentators claim that human rights are im-
plicitly consistent with the WTO and that the WTO should be read consistent 
with other international law obligations, including human rights treaties and prin-
ciples of customary international law.5 As will be discussed below, there have 
been numerous examples of WTO members finding ways to allow human rights 
concerns to be addressed, and for such concerns to be acknowledged by dispute 
settlement panels and the Appellate Body. 
Nonetheless, the WTO membership as a whole is highly unlikely to provide 
for more explicit human rights-related obligations in any sort of agreement. De-
veloping countries are generally opposed to such provisions and have not been 
willing to discuss them in the WTO context. Although developing countries can 
use their numbers to their advantage within the WTO, they are not able to do so 
when negotiating an FTA with a developed-country partner.6 In the FTA con-
3 Petersmann has published extensively on this subject for over twenty years. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, CONsTrrrUIoNAL FUNCTIONS AND CONsTIrruTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMic LAW (1991); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT'i. 
EcON. L. 19 (2000); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations "Global Compact"for Inte-
gratingHuman Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations:Lessonsfrom European Integration, 13 
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 621 (2002). For an extensive list of Petersmann's publications on this subject prior 
to 2002, see Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A 
Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUROPEAN J. INT'i. L. 815, n3 (2002). 
4 For a particularly harsh critique, see Alston, supra note 3. For other critiques, see Robert Howse 
and Kalypso Nicolaides, Legitimacy Through "HigherLaw"? Why Constitutionalizingthe WTO is a Step 
Too Far, in THOMAS COTnER AND PvrROS MAVROIDIS, EDS., THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE: LESSONS FOR THE 
WTO (2002); Steve Peers, FundamentalRight or PoliticalWhim? WTO Law andthe European Court of 
Justice, in GRAINNE DE BJRCA AND JOANNE Sco'rr, EDS., THE EU AND THE WTO (2001). 
5 See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, WTO DisputeSettlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753, 
755 (2002) ("Unless otherwise prescribed, WTO provisions must evolve and be interpreted consistently 
with international law, including human rights law . . . . [A] good faith interpretation of the relevant 
WTO and human rights provisions should lead to a reading of WTO law coherent with human rights 
law."). 
6 Cf Marcia Harpaz, When East Meets West: Approximation of Laws in the EU-Mediterranean 
Context, 43 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 993, 999 (2006) (discussing the EU's expectation that its Medi-
terranean neighbors will unilaterally align their legislation in certain respects to that of the EU rather than 
the parties engaging in a "give and take" negotiation). 
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text, many developing countries have acceded to the demands of developed coun-
tries by agreeing to some form of human rights obligations.7 
There have been a variety of efforts to discipline human rights through trade 
agreements. In some cases, provisions are included that make specific reference 
to "human rights." The European Union has long included such human rights 
clauses in its agreements.8 Other agreements include chapters or other provisions 
that, while not using the term "human rights," are nonetheless linked to an objec-
tive that can be seen as human rights-related. Examples include provisions re-
quiring the parties to abide by International Labor Organization treaties.9 Many 
FTAs, including all FTAs entered into by the United States, include labor-related 
provisions - sometimes in the form of an entire chapter.' 0 FTAs with provisions 
designed to protect indigenous peoples and their innovations arguably also fit 
into this category. Some provisions are designed to reserve the right to take mea-
sures to further the interests of indigenous peoples, even if doing so results in 
giving better treatment to a segment of the domestic population than is accorded 
to the trading partner. New Zealand includes such provisions in its FTAs, de-
signed to preserve the policy space necessary to comply with its obligations to 
Maori pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi.'I Other agreements include provisions 
relating to the protection of traditional knowledge.1 2 Examples include the China 
- New Zealand FTA, which provides that the parties may, subject to their respec-
tive international obligations, "establish appropriate measures to protect genetic 
resources, traditional knowledge and folklore."' 3 
7 See, e.g., EMu.,im HAFNER-BURToN, FoRCED 'ro BE4 Gooi: WHY TRADE AGREEMENTs BooST 
HUMAN RIGHTs, 4 (2009). 
8 See, e.g., LORAND BARTELs, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDRIIONALIfY IN THE EU's INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS (Oxford 2005). 
9 For example, the labor chapter in the United States - Peru FTA establishes a number of obligations 
to comply with ILO obligations. See United States - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (2006), ch. 17, 
particularly Arts. 17.1-17.3, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftal 
peru/asset-upload-file73_9496.pdf. 
10 For a discussion of the range of labor provisions in FTAs to which the United States is a party, see 
David A. Gantz, Labor Rights and EnvironmentalProtection Under NAFTA andother U.S. Free Trade 
Agreements, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Riv. 297 (2011). 
I See, e.g., New Zealand - Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (entered into force 
Jul. 1, 2005), Art. 15.8, para. I ("Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Party or as a disguised restriction on trade in goods 
and services or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the adoption by New Zealand of 
measures it deems necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Maori in respect of matters covered 
by this Agreement including in fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi."). For the full 
text of the agreement see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, New Zealand - Thailand 
Closer Economic PartnershipAgreement, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nzffrade-and-Economic-
Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Thailand/Closer-Economic-Partnership-Agreement-
text/index.php. 
12 "Traditional knowledge" refers to "knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that are developed, 
sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its 
cultural or spiritual identity." See World Intellectual Property Organization, TraditionalKnowledge, 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/. 
13 See New Zealand - China Free Trade Agreement, chapter 12, Art. 165 (entered into force Oct. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/l-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0-downloads/ 
NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf. For a discussion of FTA provisions relating to traditional 
knowledge, see Susy Frankel, Attempts to ProtectIndigenous Culture Through Free Trade Agreements, 
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The European Union (EU) has been the most prominent proponent of includ-
ing human rights clauses in FTAs, having done so for well over twenty years.14 
The EU's agreements have generally contained provisions indicating that respect 
for human rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
constituted "an essential element" of the agreement.' 5 Despite these provisions, 
earlier agreements contained no operational language requiring any particular im-
plementing measures to ensure the protection of human rights, nor any enforce-
ment mechanism should human rights be violated.1 6 More recently, the EU has 
included implementation provisions that obligate the parties to implement mea-
sures necessary for their fulfillment of their FTA obligations, including a human 
rights clause.1 7 Notwithstanding such provisions, the FTAs vary in the degree to 
which - if at all - the human rights clauses are subject to the agreements' dispute 
settlement provisions. Also, even when dispute settlement is a possibility, the EU 
has generally stopped short of exercising its full rights with respect to its trading 
partners' human rights violations.' 8 While it is primarily the EU that includes 
human rights clauses in its FTAs, the United States and other countries often 
include provisions relating to labor rights that can be seen as a type of human 
rights provision.' 9 While labor rights abuses can be seen as human rights abuses, 
it is not clear that the purposes of labor chapters in FTAs have much to do with 
protecting human rights. The motivation for including such clauses is instead to 
assuage the concerns of those - particularly Democrats in the United States Con-
gress - who worry that the proposed free trade agreements will lead to a shift in 
jobs to developing countries due to lower wages and lax labor standards in those 
countries. 20 Thus, the impetus for including labor chapters in FTAs seems to be 
the desire to protect, or be seen to be protecting, workers in the developed coun-
try instead of protecting workers' rights in the developing country. Given the 
motivation for such provisions, we should not be sanguine that their inclusion in 
FTAs is a step forward for human rights. 
in CHRISTOPH B. GRABER, KAROLINA KUPRECHT AND JESSICA C. LAI, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND PoIcY IssuEs (2012). 
14 See HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7, at 51-52 (describing EU protections of human rights in trade 
agreements dating back to the early 1990s). 
15 See UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, UNrED NATIONS, availableat http://www.un.org/en/ 
documents/udhr/. 
16 Lorand Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade 
Agreements, University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No. 24/2012 (Sept. 2012) at 4, 8. 
'7 Id. at 4. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 See Zolomphi Nkowani, InternationalTrade and Labour: A Quest for Moral Legitimacy, 8 J. 
INT'L TRADE L. & Poi.'Y 4, 10 (2009) (arguing that "is beyond dispute ... that labour rights are human 
rights . . . ."). For a discussion of labor clauses in United States FTAs, see Nkowani at 10-11. 
20 HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7, at 58, 62-64. 
Volume 12, Issue 1I Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 5 
Human Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
III. Human Rights and FTAs - Missing the Target? 
A. Effectiveness of Human Rights Provisions in FTAs 
Although the EU uses FTAs as a mechanism for imposing human rights provi-
sions on developing countries, and the United States has also included human 
rights-related provisions in its FTAs, most commonly relating to labor stan-
dards, 21 it is unclear whether such provisions go very far towards reducing the 
most significant human rights abuses worldwide. 
There is some data to suggest the provisions used by the EU and United States 
have, in some cases, had positive effects on their FTA partners' compliance with 
human rights obligations. 2 2 Of course there is a real question whether it is appro-
priate or desirable for developed countries to be dictating conditions of behavior 
to developing countries. However, if one ascribes to the "the ends justify the 
means" school of thought, then FTAs still do not appear to be a particularly 
effective instrument for addressing human rights concerns. 
The author of a detailed examination of the use of human rights provisions in 
trade agreements has concluded the EU and US's motivations in including such 
provisions has more to do with politics and other considerations than with any 
genuine concern for a positive human rights outcome: 
[T]he rise of a human rights discourse should be viewed with at least 
some skepticism. . ..Many policymakers may not actually be as invested 
in the human rights outcome, or the effects of the policy, as they could 
be. . ..And so they may be willing to trade off or sell down certain aspects 
of human rights to win a political compromise that seems indefensible to 
moral advocates and that could have harmful, and certainly unintended, 
effects. 23 
Such inconsistencies are evident in developed countries' approaches to trade 
agreements with developing countries. The United Nations High Commission for 
Human Rights has cautioned developing countries about the potential human 
rights implications of adopting intellectual property protections more stringent 
than those required under the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), commonly referred to as TRIPS-plus provi-
sions. 2 4 Such provisions include data exclusivity for patented pharmaceuticals, 
making it more difficult for less expensive generic medications to compete in the 
21 Nkowani, supra note 19. 
22 See generally HAFNmR-BURTON, supra note 7. 
23 HAlWER-BURTON, supra note 7, at 172. See also Stephen Joseph Powell and Patricia Camino Pe-
rez, Global Laws, Local Lives: Impact of the New Regionalism on Human Rights Compliance, 17 BupF. 
Hum. Rrs. L. REv. 117, 149 (2011) ("[M]any of the human rights provisions negotiated arguably serve 
the political and economic agendas of the developed countries rather than the actual concerns of the 
regional partners about their failure to implement human rights obligations to the betterment of their civil 
societies."). 
24 loana Cismas, The Integration of Human Rights in Bilateral and Plurilateral Free Trade Agree-
ments: Arguments for a Coherent Relationship with Reference to the Swiss Context, 21-SUM CURRENTS: 
INT'i- TRADE L. J. 3, 6 (2013). 
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marketplace. In the Dominican Republic - Central America - United States FTA 
(DR-CAFTA) negotiations, Guatemala in particular attempted to fight against 
such provisions, but was unsuccessful. 25 The United States and other developed 
countries simultaneously require TRIPS-plus commitments in their FTAs with 
developing countries while including provisions requiring various human rights 
protections - and sometimes declining to include provisions sought by the devel-
oping country to assist in promoting its economy. For example, while the United 
States and other developed countries have insisted upon TRIPS-plus provisions 
within FTAs, they have largely declined to provide protections for the traditional 
knowledge of the developing country partner.26 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this re-
flects a preference by developed countries for political rights over economic and 
social rights. 27 
The culprits are not limited to the United States and European Union. The 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights identified an 
example of this preference in Switzerland's FTAs. It noted that by requiring its 
FTA partners to accede to the International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, Switzerland's FTAs could jeopardize its partners' right to 
food (on the basis that adherence to the convention may increase the cost of food 
production). 28 In the context of the PACER Plus trade negotiations, New Zealand 
and Australia have been accused of pressuring Pacific Island countries to in-
crease market access for fatty cuts of meat, alcohol and tobacco products. 29 
Developed countries therefore often send a mixed message with respect to 
their interest in promoting human rights. Countries appear to push for provisions 
that suit their policy preferences, which reflect different priorities in different 
countries. The United States includes in its conditions - both in its GSP program 
25 Powell and Perez, supra note 23 at 148-49. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Trade Agreements and 
Health in Developing Countries, 373 THE LANCET 363, 364 (2009) ("But perhaps the most adverse 
consequences for health arise from provisions in trade agreements that are designed to restrict access to 
generic medicines. These include . . . the data exclusivity provisions that have become a standard part of 
US and European bilateral trade agreements."). 
26 Colombia and Peru unsuccessfully sought such protections in their respective FTA negotiations 
with the United States. See Powell and Perez, supra note 23, at 146-47. 
27 Not all developed countries have insisted on TRIPS-plus provisions. Indeed, Norway refused to 
support negotiating for the inclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions in the EFTA-India FTA precisely because 
it did not wish to impede India's access to affordable medicines. Cismas, supra note 24, at 6. 
28 Cismas, supra note 24, at 6. 
29 The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) is an umbrella agreement be-
tween Australia and New Zealand and the Forum Island Countries that sets out a plan for staged trade 
liberalization and cooperation. At present these countries are negotiating "PACER Plus", which will be a 
free trade agreement between the Forum Island countries and Australia and New Zealand. See New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
(PACER,) availableat http://www.mfat.gov.ws/PACER.html. For a discussion of the potential negative 
health implications for the Pacific Islands countries of PACER Plus, see Adam Wolfenden, Health Impli-
cations of PACER-Plusfor Pacific Island Countries, Pacific Network on Globalisation (Oct. 14, 2014), 
availableat http://pang.org.fj/health-implications-of-pacer-plus-for-pacific-island-countries/ ("Non-com-
municable diseases are already a major problem for many FICs and commitments under PACER-Plus 
could exacerbate this as tariffs are cut. There are concerns that FICs will have their ability to ban the 
import of such fatty foods as mutton flaps, turkey tails, as well as food high in sugar content curtailed."); 
see also David Legge et al., TRADE AGREEMENTS AND NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES IN THE PACIFIC 
ISLANDS 10 (2013), available at http://www.who.int/nmh/events/2013/trade-agreement.pdf. 
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and its FTAs - provisions relating to the human rights of children, but does not 
require that recipient countries outlaw other serious human rights violations, such 
as torture or murder.30 In contrast, the EU has emphasized workers' human rights 
in its GSP scheme, but has tended to refer to human rights without specifying 
labor rights in its FTAs. 3 1 
These contradictory approaches are not limited to GSP programs and FTAs, 
but are also evident in bilateral negotiations in connection with new WTO mem-
bers' protocols of accession. In order to join the WTO, a non-member must attain 
the consensus of all existing members that it should be permitted to accede. 32 In 
practice this has led to significant demands from the existing membership, partic-
ularly the United States, for concessions that go beyond the terms of the WTO 
Agreements.3 3 These "WTO-plus" requests are de facto requirements if the non-
member wishes to receive the consensus it needs to become a member. These 
demands may do damage to the would-be member's development interests. For 
example, as a condition of Samoa's accession to the WTO, the United States 
required Samoa to lift its existing restrictions on the importation of turkey tails, a 
cheap and very fatty product that is treated as a waste product in Samoa, which 
has the world's highest percentage of obesity. Samoa had its measures in place to 
make this unhealthy product less accessible. However, just as Australia and New 
Zealand did for mutton flaps, the United States saw a market opportunity and 
seized upon it.34 
Nevertheless, demands made in the context of WTO accession may be di-
rected at rectifying deficiencies in judicial independence, affording legal protec-
tions for individuals and businesses, providing avenues for public participation in 
proposed rule-making, and other changes directed at improving transparency and 
reducing the potential for corruption in domestic regulatory and judicial 
processes.35 Thus, some aspects of the WTO accession process are likely to lead 
to improvements in human rights. 
B. Lack of Capture of Worst Offenders 
Unfortunately, even if human rights provisions in existing FTAs are having 
positive effects, these agreements are not reaching the most significant human 
30 HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7 at 10. 
31 Id. at 10, 12. 
32 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, Art. XII [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; see also WTO, Accessions, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acce/acce.htm ("Any state or customs territory having full 
autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may become a member ("accede to") the WTO, but all 
WTO members must agree on the terms."). 
33 See, e.g., Julia Ya Qin, 'WTO-Plus' Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Or-
ganization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 
483 (2003). 
34 See, e.g., Samoa Rewardedfor Turkey Tail Turnaround, SAMOA OuSRveR (Oct. 3, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.samoaobserver.ws/local-news/otherlbusiness/1314-samoa-rewarded-for-turkey-tail-
turnaround. 
35 See, e.g., Susan Ariel Aaronson and M. Rodman Abouharb, Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT, 
the WTO and Some Democratic Rights, 55 INT'L. STUD. Q. 1, 7-8 (2011). 
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rights abuses. Those abuses are not disciplined or addressed by the vast majority 
of free trade agreements, even those containing human rights provisions. This is 
because the worst human rights offenders largely do not participate in interna-
tional trade agreements, including the WTO and FTAs. 
Given the broad range of human rights instruments, it is not always evident 
what types of abuses are occurring when "human rights violations" are discussed 
in broad terms.3 6 Nonetheless, various organizations and the press have cata-
logued countries in order to identify the most egregious violators of human 
rights. Although it is not clear what criteria were applied to create these rankings, 
which are not identical from list to list, there are significant overlaps. Two such 
lists are provided here as illustrative examples. What is striking about these lists 
is how few of the listed countries are members of the WTO.37 
According to the Christian Science Monitor, in 2013, the world's worst human 
rights violators were:38 
Tibet (not a WTO member) 
Uzbekistan (not a WTO member) 
Turkmenistan (not a WTO member) 
Sudan (not a WTO member) 
Somalia (not a WTO member) 
North Korea (not a WTO member) 
Libya (not a WTO member) 
Eritrea (not a WTO member) 
Equatorial Guinea (not a WTO member) 
Myanmar (is a WTO member) 
The worst violators in 2014, according to Human Rights Risk Atlas, are:3 9 
Syria (not a WTO member) 
Sudan (not a WTO member) 
DR Congo (is a WTO member) 
Pakistan (is a WTO member) 
Somalia (not a WTO member) 
Afghanistan (not a WTO member) 
Iraq (not a WTO member) 
Myanmar (is a WTO member) 
Yemen (not a WTO member) 
Nigeria (is a WTO member) 
There are a few overlaps on these lists, with Myanmar, Somalia and Sudan 
appearing on both. However, of the seventeen different countries listed, only four 
36 It is likely that the abuses garnering the most attention are violations of civil and political rights 
rather than economic, social or cultural rights. See Mutua, supra note 2. 
37 The status of each country as a WTO member or not is indicated in parenthesis following the 
country's name. 
38 World's Worst Human Rights Violators, CHRISTIAN ScIENCE MONrroR (Nov. 7, 2013), http:// 
www.csmonitor.com/Photo-Galleries/Lists/World-s-worst-human-rights-violators#279281. 
39 Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics, Human Rights Risk Atlas 2014, MAPLECROir GLoBA. RISK 
ANALYrics, http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/12/04/70-increase-countries-identified-
extreme-risk-human-rights-2008-bhuman-rights-risk-atlas-2014b/. 
Volume 12, Issue 1I Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 9 
Human Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
- Nigeria, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Democratic Republic of Congo - are mem-
bers of the WTO, and only one WTO member, Myanmar, appears on both lists. 
There is also a correlation between corruption and the fulfillment of human 
rights. 4 0 In particular, "[t]he protection of human rights is inversely affected by 
the presence of corruption in a society." 4 1It has even been argued that corruption 
can itself be a direct violation of human rights. 4 2 
Given the connection between corruption and human rights abuses, the most 
corrupt countries likely have significant human rights issues as well. Trans-
parency International measures the perceived levels of corruption in countries 
worldwide, based on expert opinion. In the 2013 study, the ten countries per-
ceived to have the highest levels of corruption (from worst to tenth-worst) 
4 3were: 
Somalia (not a WTO member) 
North Korea (not a WTO member) 
Afghanistan (not a WTO member) 
Sudan (not a WTO member) 
South Sudan (not a WTO member) 
Libya (not a WTO member) 
Iraq (not a WTO member) 
Uzbekistan (not a WTO member) 
Turkmenistan (not a WTO member) 
Syria (not a WTO member) 
It is striking that not a single one of the most corrupt countries is a member of the 
WTO. 
There is also a correlation between human rights violations and corruption on 
the one hand and lack of participation in FTAs on the other. There are numerous 
FTAs in existence between a developed country on the one hand and a develop-
ing country on the other, and many of these contain human rights-related obliga-
tions. However, such agreements tend not to be with the worst human rights 
abusers,44 which suggests such agreements may be of limited value in addressing 
human rights issues. The vast majority of FTAs WTO members enter into are 
40 See United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N.Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 
31, 2003) (taking the view that corruption is adversely related to the realization of human rights). 
41 James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationshipbetween Human Rights and Corruption,31 U. PA. J. 
lmr'i L. 125, 147 (2009). 
42 Julio Bacio Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights, (Int'l Council on Human 
Rights Policy Working Paper 2008), availableat http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/150/13l1_terracinoen 
2008.pdf. 
43 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAiL, http://www.transparency 
.org/cpi2013/results (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
44 There are numerous South-South FTAs; however, such agreements are often between neighboring 
countries with similar factor endowments and export portfolios, meaning that the gains from trade 
achieved by such agreements are likely to be modest. See JAMES THUO GATHIi, AFRICAN REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS As LEGAL REGIMEs (2011) at 8 (noting this to be the case in the context of African 
FTAs). 
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with other WTO members. 4 5 The WTO rules dictate this dynamic. Under the 
rules, WTO members must give each other most-favored nation (MFN) status; 
MFN requires a WTO member to give to every other WTO member treatment 
that is at least as good as that given to any other country. 4 6 Thus, in the absence 
of an applicable exception, WTO members should treat all other WTO members 
the same without favoring any particular trading partner over the others. The 
MFN requirement applies, inter alia, to tariff rates. 4 7 Therefore, a WTO mem-
ber's tariff rate on a given line of its tariff schedule should be the same for all 
WTO member-exporting countries. Furthermore, because MFN requires that 
WTO members give each other the best treatment given to "any other country," 
any preferential treatment given to a non-WTO member must be extended "im-
mediately and unconditionally" to all WTO members.4 8 
There are a number of exceptions to the MFN rule. 4 9 For our purposes, the 
most significant one is GATT Article XXIV, which provides that WTO members 
may enter into FTAs (and customs unions) with each other without extending the 
provisions of such agreements on an MFN basis to other WTO members, so long 
as certain criteria are satisfied.50 In other words, the MFN obligation does not 
apply to Article XXIV-compliant FTAs. Thus, the parties to an FTA falling 
within the scope of Article XXIV do not need to extend to other WTO members 
the favorable treatment they grant to one another. With respect to the scope of 
Article XXIV, the text provides in relevant part that customs unions and FTAs 
are permitted "as between the territories of contracting parties" if certain elabo-
rated conditions are satisfied.5 ' Thus, it appears that FTAs between a WTO mem-
ber and a non-WTO member would not fall within the Article XXIV exception to 
the MFN obligation. Accordingly, if a WTO member entered into such an FTA, 
it would be obligated to extend to its fellow WTO members any provisions in the 
FTA that were more favorable than the treatment being provided prior to the 
45 The WTO maintains a Regional Trade Agreements Information System, which includes an online 
list of all FTAs that have been notified to the WTO. WTO, Welcome to the Regional TradeAgreements 
Information System (RTA-IS), http://rtais.wto.org/Ul/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (last updated Jan. 
15, 2015). 
46 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. I 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
47 GATT Art. 1:1. 
48 Id. 
49 The exceptions to the most-favored nation principle are pervasive, so much so that MFN has been 
termed "least favored nation" or LFN, as countries give better than the MFN rate to so many other WTO 
members. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The Law, Economics and Politics of PreferentialTradingArrange-
ments: An Introduction,46 STAN. J. INT'iL L. 171 (2010). For a discussion of this phenomenon, see The 
Futureof the WTO, Report by the ConsultativeBoard to Director-GeneralSupachaiPanitchpakdi(2005) 
("the Sutherland Report") at 19-21, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/lOanniv-e/future_ 
wto e.pdf. The Sutherland Report references the particularly stark example of the European Union, 
which at the time of publication in 2005 gave better than MFN treatment to all WTO members except for 
nine (Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore 
and the United States). The case of the EU has since become even more noteworthy as it has since 
concluded an FTA with Korea and is currently negotiating FTAs with Canada, Japan, Singapore, and the 
United States. 
50 GATT Art. XXIV. 
51 GATT Art. XXIV:5. 
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creation of the FTA. For this reason, the vast majority of FTAs are amongst 
WTO members. 52 
C. Not in Developing Countries' Best Interests 
Bilateral FTAs between a developed country and a developing country often 
contain provisions that the developing country does not consider attractive, in-
cluding human rights provisions, TRIPS-plus intellectual property obligations, 
and labor and environmental commitments. 53 While developing countries have 
successfully fended off these types of provisions for possible inclusion in WTO 
agreements, they are nonetheless willing to agree to them in a one-on-one negoti-
ating context. 54 The bilateral negotiating context is therefore viewed as less 
favorable overall for developing countries than the WTO, where the developing 
countries are in the majority and can block the negotiation of agreements or 
terms that they find objectionable.5 5 
In addition, negotiating FTAs takes time and resources, which are then not 
available to apply in the context of WTO negotiations. This has been a negative 
development for poorer WTO members - a trend that is likely to get worse, as 
discussed below. 
D. Trend Towards FTAs that Exclude the Poorer WTO Members 
Currently a new wrinkle is emerging with respect to FTAs that suggests even 
more strongly that the WTO is the better forum for developing countries. Previ-
ously, FTAs were primarily bilateral, no more ambitious than the WTO in terms 
of commitments, and often included developing countries. The world's economic 
powerhouses were not pairing with each other, but with countries with which 
they saw a benefit - perhaps for political or other non-economic strategic reasons 
- to allying. Now, however, the trend in FTAs seems to be towards multi-party 
agreements with high-standards objectives that by and large do not include the 
poorest WTO members. 
Until recently, FTAs were primarily: between neighboring or closely proxi-
mate countries; between a developed and a developing country; covering similar 
52 There are some exceptions. For example, some WTO members have entered into customs unions 
or free trade agreements with neighboring non-WTO member countries. In most such cases, the non-
WTO member is in the process of WTO accession. 
53 See, e.g., Arie Reich, Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in International Economic Law: Apply-
ing the Principle of Subsidiarity, 60 U. TORONTo L.J. 263, 287 (2010). 
54 See generally HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7; Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Spe-
cies Emerges: Is Bilateralisma Threat?, 10 J. INT'i. EcON L. 571, 583 (2007) ("weaker actors have a 
better chance to have their voices heard, and their policy choices taken into account" in the multilateral 
consensus-based system). Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explain-
ing the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'. L. 639 (1997-1998) (discussing 
similar phenomenon in context of BITs). 
55 See, e.g., David Kinley and Hai Nguyen, Viet Nam, Human Rights and Trade: Implications of Viet 
Nam's Accession to the WTO 40 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Working Paper No. 39 2008) (difficulties in 
WTO negotiations "can, and has, lead to an upsurge in the negotiation of bi-lateral trade agreements 
which inevitably favour the powerful over the weak and dilute the overall protective reach (albeit limited) 
of multi-lateral agreements such as the WTO"). 
12 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 12, Issue I 
Human Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
topics to the WTO; and/or between a superpower and a much smaller developed 
country. Thus, the major economies were entering into FTAs with a variety of 
trading partners, but not with each other. There is currently no FTA between any 
two of the United States, European Union, China or Japan, nor between any two 
of Japan, China and South Korea. However, this dynamic is changing rapidly. At 
present the United States and the European Union are negotiating the Trans-At-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP);56 the United States and Japan 
are negotiating an FTA along with ten other countries in the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP) negotiations;57 and Japan, China and South Korea are all engaged 
in the sixteen-country negotiations to form the Regional Cooperation and Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP).58 In tandem, China, Japan and Korea are negotiating 
a trilateral FTA, known as "CJK", and China and Korea have all but wrapped up 
bilateral FTA negotiations. Thus, much of the FTA momentum consists of the 
largest economies finally pairing up, rather than linkages with poorer countries. 
In addition, there has been a recent move towards pursuing broader and deeper 
economic integration efforts within FTAs. While many previous FTAs largely 
tracked the subject matters of the WTO, more recently, FTAs and other trade 
agreement negotiations have increasingly included subjects that are outside the 
scope of the WTO. For example, the TPP, mentioned above, has been character-
ized by the parties as a "twenty-first century trade agreement".59 While the exact 
meaning of this term is unclear, it seems to refer to both the breadth and depth of 
the agreement. 60 In terms of depth, it is understood that there will be no a priori 
exclusions of any tariff lines from the trade in goods coverage.61 This differs 
from most FTAs which tend to provide carve-outs for anywhere from a relatively 
small to quite a large number of tariff lines associated with products seen as 
sensitive or otherwise of particular importance to one or more of the participating 
countries.62 While it remains to be seen whether the TPP will indeed include 
56 See TransatlanticTrade and Investment Partnership,OF1FCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
availableat http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
57 See Trans-PacificPartnership,OFFICE oiF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at http:// 
www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
58 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia), Regional Comprehensive Economic 
PartnershipNegotiations, availableat http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/. 
59 See Trans-PacificPartnershipLeaders Statement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
(Nov. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/201 I/november/ 
trans-pacific-partnership-leaders-statement. 
60 Addressing this question is one of the primary objectives of a recent book. See THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT (C.L. Lim, Deborah Elms 
and Patrick Low, eds.) (Cambridge 2012). 
61 See, e.g., Outlines of the Trans-PacificPartnershipAgreement, OFIPCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/ 
november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement ("The TPP tariff schedule will cover all goods, 
representing some 11,000 tariff lines.") [hereinafter USTR TPP Fact Sheet]. 
62 The agricultural sector in particular is often carved out in whole or in part. See, e.g., Warren 
Maruyama, PreferentialTrade Agreements and the Erosion of the WTO's MFN Principle, 46 STAN. J. 
INT'i L. 177, 190 (2010) (discussing the phenomenon of FTAs with major sectoral exclusions); Matthew 
Schaefer, Ensuring That Regional TradeAgreements Complement the WTO System: U.S. Unilateralisma 
Supplement o WTO Initiatives?, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 585, 570 (2007) (discussing the tendency to ex-
clude agriculture from FTAs); Richard H. Steinberg, JudicialLawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Con-
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commitments to remove tariffs on every single tariff line, it is unusual in even 
professing that such an outcome would be desirable. 63 With respect to breadth, 
the TPP will address several areas that generally have not been covered by FTAs. 
These include provisions dealing with regulatory coherence; supply chain man-
agement; state-owned enterprises; small- and medium-sized enterprises; and e-
commerce. 64 In addition, the TPP will have chapters addressing environmental 
protection and labor standards.6 5 Consistent with many United States FTAs, the 
provisions of these chapters may be subject to binding dispute settlement. While 
this is a common feature of United States FTAs, most other countries only apply 
hortatory or "best endeavors" language to describe any FTA text pertaining to 
protecting the environment or guaranteeing labor rights. 
At the same time that the largest economies are negotiating FTAs with one 
another, larger groupings of countries are also in the process of negotiating sec-
tor-specific plurilateral agreements such as the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TiSA).66 These negotiations are endeavors to incorporate broader subject matter 
coverage and deeper liberalization than is presently covered by the WTO Agree-
ments, particularly in sectors involving rapidly evolving technologies. Countries 
that produce technology are finding the GATS increasingly anachronistic given 
its outdated services definitions and categories. 67 The poorest WTO members, 
which generally do not produce technology, have not sought to participate in 
these negotiations. 68 This dynamic, coupled with the lack of progress in conclud-
ing the Doha Round, has led coalitions of the willing to negotiate on their own. 
Because these plurilateral negotiations comprise like-minded countries interested 
in accelerating trade liberalization, the discussions are unlikely to involve much, 
stitutional,and PoliticalConstraints,98 AM. J. INrr'i. L. 247, 268 (2004) (noting that many of the EC's 
FTAs exclude agriculture). 
63 It is difficult to imagine that this will be the case due to a few extreme sensitivities, the most 
notable of which is Japan's tariff on rice. The most likely scenario is that rice would be included, but that 
Japan's obligations to lower tariffs would consist of something short of reducing such tariffs to zero over 
a given time period. Instead, the agreement could call for Japan to lower its tariffs over time, but perhaps 
not remove them entirely. See, e.g., Tariff Agreement with the U.S. Stands in Way of TPP, THE JAPAN 
TiMEs (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/02/national/tariff-disagreement-with-u-
s-stands-in-way-of-tpp/#.UOYG26L6r6M (noting that of five categories of farm products Japan is trying 
to shelter from tariff cuts, the U.S. has insisted on comprehensive tariff removal for four categories, but 
has "shown signs of being flexible on giving exceptional treatment to rice"). 
6 See, e.g., Embassies of Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore & Viet-
nam, Trans Pacific Partnership:a 21st Century Agreement, availableat http://www.usnzcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/ 1/TPP-at-a-glance.pdf. 
65 See USTR TPP Fact Sheet, supra note 61. 
66 See Shin-yi Peng, Is the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) a Stepping Stone for the Next Version 
of GATS? 43 HONG KONG L.J. 611 (2013); Coalition of Services Industries, The Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA), available at https://servicescoalition.org/negotiations/trade-in-services-agreement. 
67 Peng, supra note 66 at 611. 
68 The current TiSA participants are Australia; Canada; Chile; Chinese Taipei; Colombia; Costa 
Rica; the European Union; Hong Kong (China); Iceland; Israel; Japan; Liechtenstein; New Zealand; 
Norway; Mexico; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; South Korea; Switzerland; Turkey; and the United 
States. The parties have made clear that other WTO members that share the group's objectives are wel-
come to join the negotiations. See Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ 
topics-domaines/services/tisa-acs.aspx?lang=eng. 
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if any, discussion of special and differential treatment for developing countries. 
This is a significant difference from the WTO context. Within the WTO, the 
principle of special and differential treatment is well-established, and is reflected 
in, inter alia, developing countries being subject to more lenient provisions and 
longer phase-in periods for a variety of commitments. 69 While the WTO process 
is imperfect, and much ink has been spilled over the failure of WTO members to 
deliver on the Doha Development Agenda, which had been promised in exchange 
for the Uruguay Round Agreements, developing countries nonetheless have a 
greater voice and have achieved far more concessions within the WTO's multi-
lateral process than in any other trade agreement context. 
Due to the size of the economies involved, these new agreements have more 
potential than previous FTAs to set the terms for future multilateral trade agree-
ments. Yet developing countries, particularly poorer ones, are largely absent 
from this new generation of FTAs. The TPP includes a number of developing 
countries - most notably Vietnam - but, unlike the WTO, does not appear to be 
designed to include less significant commitments or other special and differential 
treatment provisions for these countries. 70 Sector-specific plurilateral trade agree-
ments such as TiSA may address technologies in which poorer countries are not 
actively participating. As such, the less-developed countries are not needed to 
obtain a "critical mass". 
IV. The WTO and Human Rights 
A. WTO Membership Correlated with Improved Human Rights Records 
The data cited above suggested that not one of the ten most corrupt countries 
is a member of the WTO. As a result, there appears to be a significant correlation 
between human rights abuses and corruption on the one hand, and lack of WTO 
membership on the other. But does WTO membership "cure" the corruption and 
human rights abuses? Many commentators have critiqued the WTO in particular 
and globalization more broadly for their role in contributing to income inequality 
within countries.7' Nonetheless, even amongst those who express reservations 
about trade liberalization, many have conducted case studies and determined that 
in many instances joining the WTO has contributed to an improvement in human 
rights and a decrease in corruption. For example, Aaronson and Abouharb found 
a positive correlation between respect for democratic rights and GATT/WTO 
membership, with the level of respect for such rights increasing in tandem with 
69 See WTO, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop e/devele/dev-special_differential_provisionse.htm. 
7o See, e.g., Deborah Kay Elms, Trans-Pacific PartnershipTrade Negotiations: Some Outstanding 
Issues for the Final Stretch, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEArH L. & Pot'y 379, 396 (2013) ("RCEP 
explicitly allows special and ifferential treatment for developing economies, while the TPP does not."). 
71 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. Rizv. 1573, 1576 (2000) (linking globalization with increased income ine-
quality); Joel R. Paul, Do InternationalTrade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth andDevelop-
ment?, 44 VA. J. INT'L. L. 285, 288 (2003) (concluding that globalization has increased income inequality 
within, and amongst, countries). For a critique of the critics, see Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiquing the 
Critics of Economic Globalization, I J. INT'L L. & INr'i- REL. 213, 220-26 (2005). 
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the length of GATT/WTO membership. 72 They provide examples indicating that 
both the WTO accession process and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism have 
played important roles in these improvements, as these processes provide other 
members with the opportunity to identify problems such as lack of transparency, 
failure to provide the opportunity for democratic participation in various 
processes, and partiality in regulatory or other processes affecting businesses.73 
Kinley and Nguyen have similarly determined that Vietnam's human rights re-
cord has improved since its accession to the WTO. 7 4 
Accordingly, a better path towards protecting human rights may be to promote 
WTO membership and to facilitate developing country participation within the 
WTO, particularly in WTO negotiations. If this is accepted, it should be seen as a 
positive that many least-developed countries (LDCs) were founding members of 
the WTO, and several others (Cambodia, Cape Verde, Laos, Nepal and Yemen) 
have joined since the WTO's inception.7 5 Nonetheless, the WTO accession pro-
cess can be extremely lengthy and challenging, with some countries abandoning 
the process before achieving membership. 76 
B. Developing Countries Get More of a Say 
Developing countries are better able to negotiate for redistributive or other 
welfare-enhancing measures in the context of the WTO than in a bilateral agree-
ment. Although developing countries have sometimes been disappointed with the 
WTO as a forum for progressing their interests, the WTO is nonetheless a prefer-
able avenue for developing countries than bilateral FTAs. First, within the WTO, 
developing countries have the ability to use their numbers to their advantage in 
promoting certain agendas and putting a halt to others. A significant majority of 
the WTO's 160 members 77 comprises developing and least developed coun-
tries.7 8 As a result of the developing countries' demands, the WTO agreements 
contain many different provisions that reflect the principle of "special and differ-
ential treatment" for developing countries.7 9 
72 See Aaronson and Abouharb, supra note 35. 
73 Id. 
74 Kinley and Nguyen, supra note 55. 
75 See WTO, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6_e. 
htm (detailing a complete list of WTO members, including dates of accession). 
76 See UNCTAD, The Least Developed CountriesReport: Linking InternationalTrade with Poverty 
Reduction, (2004) chapter 3 (discussing LDC accession to the WTO) available at http://unctad.org/en/ 
docs/ldc2004_en.pdf. 
77 There were 160 members as of Jul. 20, 2014. Yemen is the newest WTO member, having ratified 
its Protocol of Accession earlier this year. See WTO, Yemen to Become 160th WTO Member (May 27, 
2014), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news 14_e/acc.yem_27may l4_.e.htm. 
78 The WTO website indicates that over two-thirds of Members are developing countries. WTO, 
Trade and Development, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-eldevel-eldevele.htm. 
79 The WTO Secretariat has periodically prepared compilations of the various special and differential 
treatment provisions. For the most recent version see WTO, Implementation of Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisionsin WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W77 (Oct. 25, 2000), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/d2legle.htm. 
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The 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference outcomes reflect the impact of develop-
ing countries banding together within the WTO. The Bali package includes sev-
eral notable decisions of interest to developing countries, including an 
Agreement on Trade Facilitation;80 an interim agreement relating to the stockpil-
ing of food for food security purposes;8' and a pledge to improve the level of 
duty-free and quota-free market access provided to least developing countries. 82 
C. The WTO as a Space to Address Some Human Rights Concerns 
1. Power in Numbers 
While developing countries can band together in the WTO context, negotiating 
a bilateral FTA presents a very different dynamic. When a relatively poor coun-
try negotiates an FTA with a wealthy one, the inequality in bargaining power 
unsurprisingly results in the developed country largely dictating terms to the de-
veloping country. This can result in developing countries individually agreeing to 
terms - such as intellectual property provisions that go beyond those required by 
the WTO's TRIPS Agreement - that they have collectively resisted within the 
WTO context.8 3 Indeed, within the WTO, the least developed countries have 
been able to postpone their implementation of TRIPS since the inception of the 
organization. At present, LDCs will not have to implement TRIPS until 2021 at 
the earliest. 84 
A further benefit for developing countries is the WTO's practice of decision-
making by consensus. The strong preference for consensus means that even small 
countries can, in theory, block certain actions. While in practice a poor country 
standing alone is unlikely to stand in the way of measures to which all other 
members either agree or are acquiescent, developing countries have successfully 
influenced the WTO negotiating agenda. For example, in 1996, the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference included a number of items on a proposed negotiating 
agenda that were widely viewed as of interest to developed countries, but not to 
developing ones.85 Due to the opposition of developing countries, the so-called 
80 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, WTIMIN(13)/36, 
WTIL/911 (11 December 2013). 
81 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, WT/ 
MIN(13)/38, WT/L/913 (11 December 2013). 
82 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Duty-Free and Quota-Free Market Access for Least-
Developed Countries, WT/MIN(13)/44, WTIL/919 (Dec. I1, 2013). 
83 See, e.g., Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett and Patrick Low, Beyond Tariffs: Multilateralizing 
Non-TariffRTA Commitments, in RICHARD BALDWIN AND PATRICK Low, n1S., MULTILATERALIZING Ru-
GIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SysTnM 89 (2009) ("[Ilt is striking that many WTO 
members [have] accepted RTAs that include disciplines whose discussion they firmly rejected at the 
multilateral level."). 
8 Pursuant to TRIPS Art. 66.1, LDCs were given a ten-year transition period from the entry into 
force of the WTO before they would need to implement the bulk of TRIPS' obligations. This transition 
period was extended by the WTO membership in November 2005 to July 2013, and again in July 2013 
until July 2021. See Decision of the Councilfor TRIPS of 29 November 2005, IP/C/40 and Decision of 
the Councilfor TRIPS of 11 June 2013, IP/C/64. 
85 The Marrakesh Agreement provides that the WTO membership shall meet as the Ministerial Con-
ference at least once every two years. Marrakesh Agreement Art. IV: 1. The Ministerial Conference is the 
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"Singapore issues" - competition policy, investment, transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation - were not included in the negotiating 
agenda.86 
Thus, the WTO presents a better opportunity than do FTAs for developing 
countries to weigh in on topics that have human rights impacts. 
2. GSP 
An additional avenue under the WTO framework for human rights concerns to 
be addressed is to grant and withhold preferential tariff treatment through Gener-
alized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes. The WTO rules provide for an 
exception to the MFN principle for preferential treatment given to developing 
countries pursuant to GSP programs. In 1979, the GATT contracting parties 
adopted the Enabling Clause,8 7 which permits GATT (and now WTO) signato-
ries to grant preferential treatment to developing countries under GSP schemes 
without extending that treatment on an MFN basis to all WTO members.88 Such 
programs must be generalized, meaning that there should be some form of uni-
versal or neutral criteria to determine which countries are eligible, with like pref-
erences being applied to similarly situated countries.89 Thus, it is not acceptable 
to give lower tariffs solely to one's former colonies, but it would be permissible, 
for example, to give preferences to all countries below a certain income thresh-
old.90 Although the Enabling Clause is silent as to whether developed countries 
may condition their GSP programs on actions to be taken or abstained from on 
the part of the would-be recipients, it has been a widespread practice of GSP-
highest decision-making body of the WTO. See WTO, MinisterialConferences,available at http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/ministe.htm. There have been nine Ministerial Conferences since the 
WTO's inception; Singapore was the first. Id. Prior to the Singapore Ministerial, many of the WTO's 
developed-country members pushed for the Ministerial to launch negotiations on a number of topics. Due 
to the objections of developing country members, new negotiations were not initiated. Instead, the Min-
isterial established working groups to consider the so-called Singapore issues. See SingaporeMinisterial 
Declaration,WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996), paras. 20-22. 
86 The resistance of developing countries led to a compromise whereby Ministers only agreed to 
establish working groups to study the issues surrounding these four topics. See Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration,WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996), [20]-[22]. 
87 Differential and more favorable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing coun-
tries, Decision of 28 November 1979, GATT Doc. L/4903. 
88 GSP originated from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
1968. See Gerhard Erasmus, Accommodating Developing Countriesin the WTO: From Mega-Debatesto 
Economic PartnershipAgreements, in DEBRA P. STEGER, ED., REDESIGNING THE WORU) TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION FOR TIHE TWENiTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010). 
89 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Conditionsfor Granting TariffPreferences 
to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/ABIR para. 173 (Apr. 7, 2004) ("[The Enabling Clause] does not 
prohibit developed-country Members from granting different tariffs to products originating in different 
GSP beneficiaries, provided that such differential tariff treatment meets the remaining conditions in the 
Enabling Clause. In granting such differential tariff treatment, however, preference-granting countries are 
required, by virtue of the term 'nondiscriminatory', to ensure that identical treatment is available to all 
similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP beneficiaries that have the 'development, finan-
cial and trade needs' to which the treatment in question is intended to respond."). 
90 Id. Such schemes sometimes include preferential treatment for non-WTO members, particularly 
LDCs. For the list of the recipients to the European Union's "Everything but Arms" program, see, e.g., 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/december/tradoc_150164.pdf. 
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granting countries to impose such conditions.9' Conditions are imposed in two 
contexts. First, the GSP program as a whole may only be available to countries 
satisfying certain criteria, such as complying with human rights or other interna-
tional obligations. 9 2 Second, some GSP-grantors have a base-level GSP program 
available to all developing countries (often subject to a GDP ceiling), but then 
provide additional so-called "GSP-plus" preferences to countries meeting speci-
fied criteria.9 3 Under both contexts, developed countries have used the threat of 
removing GSP or GSP-plus treatment as a stick to encourage developing coun-
tries to, inter alia,comply with human rights obligations.94 At the same time, the 
ability to obtain the basic and/or heightened preferences is held out as a carrot to 
developing countries. Recently, the United States suspended its grant of GSP to 
Bangladesh as a result of the highly-publicized tragedies resulting in the deaths 
of over a thousand Bangladeshi garment factory workers. President Obama an-
nounced the suspension, stating Bangladesh "is not taking steps to afford interna-
tionally recognized worker rights."9 5 
Developing countries have discounted the value of the favorable treatment 
they receive from GSP programs due to developed countries erecting new trade 
barriers (such as voluntary export restraints) and excluding key products from 
their GSP schemes.96 One of the problems with GSP schemes is that the grantor 
country often grants preferences on primary products while excluding further 
manufactured products that use the primary product as an input. For example, 
unprocessed cocoa beans may be subject to preferential tariff rates, while choco-
late products such as chocolate bars will not be.9 7 This creates unfortunate incen-
tives for poor countries. It would be better from a development standpoint to shift 
from heavy emphasis on farming and exporting primary products to a trade port-
folio that included further manufacturing of those primary products. Further man-
ufacturing is where the product is transformed from a commodity into a far more 
valuable (in terms of the price it will command) product. Yet when GSP pro-
grams give preferential tariff treatment to raw materials and commodities, but not 
to value-added products, it is understandable that GSP recipients continue to pro-
91 See, e.g., Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic 
Integration, 5 YAI. HUM. RTS. & Div. L.J. 1, 53 (2002). 
92 See Susan Aronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are Penetratingthe WTO, 6 
WORLD T.R. 413, 428-29 (2007). 
93 Id. at 429. 
94 The United States links GSP status to the provision of workers' rights. The EU links certain incen-
tives to compliance with a subset of the ILO Conventions. See HAFNER-BUR[ON, supra note 7 at 9, n. 11. 
95 U.S. Suspends Trade Preferences Program for Bangladesh, GLooALPosT (Jun. 28, 2013), http:// 
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130628/us-suspends-trade-preferences-
program-bangladesh. See also U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman Comments on President's 
Decision to Suspend GSP Benefits for Bangladesh, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRAD REPRESENTATIVE (Jun. 
2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/june/michael-froman-gsp-bangla 
desh. 
96 RonnRT E. HUDEc, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 78 (1987). 
97 See, e.g., Matthew G. Snyder, Note, GSP and Development: Increasing the Effectiveness of 
NonreciprocalPreferences, 33 MICH. J. INiL L. 821, n. 166 (2012). 
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duce primary products and that such products form the bulk of their exports to 
developed countries."8 
While developing countries may be dissatisfied to some degree with the condi-
tionality of GSP programs, they do appear to provide a mechanism for developed 
countries to discipline human rights abuses. 
3. GAT Exceptions 
i. Article XX 
WTO members may also be able to influence adherence to human rights obli-
gations through the use of the GATT Article XX exceptions, in particular XX(a) 
allowing measures "necessary to protect public morals." 99 Article XX(a) has not 
been invoked frequently, and it is unclear how broadly its terms can be stretched. 
However, the recent EC - Seal Products case may signal a willingness on the 
part of the WTO Appellate Body to interpret "public morals" broadly. In the Seal 
Products dispute, the dispute settlement Panel and the Appellate Body both ac-
cepted the EU's contention that its ban on imported seal products was "necessary 
to protect public morals" under Article XX(a).im While Seal Products related to 
animal welfare rather than human rights, this decision seems to open the door to 
import restrictions based on human rights violations. In particular, it is arguably 
incongruous to allow import restrictions based on a moral objection to inhumane 
slaughter methods of seals, but to prohibit such restrictions based on a moral 
objection to violations of fundamental human rights (such as child labor). 01 
ii. Article XXI 
An additional possibility is the use of the GATT Article XXI Security excep-
tions. Article XXI allows a WTO Member to refrain from complying with WTO 
obligations through a self-judging provision that a Member State can invoke 
whenever "it considers" a measure to be "necessary for the protection of its es-
sential security interests."' 0 2 This language is then limited by requirements that 
98 See JAMES THuo GATHii, AFRICAN REGIONAL., TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMEs 9-10 
(2011) (noting that African countries primarily export unprocessed raw materials). 
99 GATT Art. XX(a). 
100 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Prohibitingthe Importationand 
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, adopted June 18, 2014, para. 5.201 ("Accordingly, we 
find that the Panel did not err in concluding that the objective of the EU Seal Regime falls within the 
scope of Article XX(a) of the GATTr 1994."); see also Panel Report, European Communities - Measures 
Prohibitingthe Importationand Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R, para. 7.639. While the Ap-
pellate Body (and Panel, albeit via logic rejected by the Appellate Body) found that the EU's measure did 
not satisfy the Art. XX chapeau and thus would need to be modified in some way (paras. 5.338-5.339), its 
finding under XX(a) is of potentially major significance. 
101 See Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, ProtectingHuman Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges 
for the World Trade Organization, Rights and Democracy (Jan. 11 2000), availableat http://www.iatp 
.org/files/ProtectingHuman Rights in-aGlobalEconomyCh.htm (arguing that Art. XX should be 
interpreted consistent with international human rights law norms). 
102 GATT Art. XXI(b). 
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the security interests relate to fissionable materials; arms and other munitions 
trafficking; or times of war or other emergencies. 0 3 
The use of Article XXI has been limited to date.104 However, during the 
GATT era, it was the basis - in tandem with United Nations Security Council 
authorization - for signatories to impose sanctions on South Africa. 05 Because 
Article XXI reads as a self-executing provision - meaning that the member 
makes the determination as to whether the exception applies, not a dispute settle-
ment panel - there may be further policy space available here to respond to 
human rights violations committed by another WTO member. 
4. Waivers 
A further flexibility within the WTO is the ability for members to provide a 
waiver to excuse one or more members from abiding by some aspect of their 
WTO commitments. 0 6 The waiver process was used in the context of a shared 
view that WTO members should comply with the Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme, which was designed to prevent any trade in diamonds that have not 
been certified as conflict-free. Implementing the Kimberley Process requires 
members to prohibit importation of certain diamonds. In theory, such import re-
strictions could have been justified under either Article XX or XXI of GATT. 0 7 
However, because members did not wish to rely upon the potential application of 
an exception, they instead decided to draft a waiver to excuse members from 
complying with WTO obligations to the extent such noncompliance was neces-
sary to comply with the Kimberley process. While the waiver may not have been 
necessary (because Article XX or XXI could perhaps have been relied upon as 
defenses, had a country trading in conflict diamonds challenged a ban on impor-
tation of such diamonds), the relevant point here is that waivers are another tool 
WTO members can use to limit trade in order to further human rights objectives. 
V. Conclusion 
Human rights provisions in FTAs may have a positive effect on human rights 
adherence in some cases. However, such advances are likely to be around the 
margins, as the most serious human rights offending countries and the most cor-
rupt nations are largely not participating in FTAs. In addition, FTAs present 
some concerns due to the inequality of bargaining power that exists in agree-
103 Id. 
10 See, e.g., Roger Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. Riy. 697, 707. 
105 Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and MultinationalCorporations: the EU-ACP 
Context, 32 HASTINGS INT'l & CoMIr. L. REv. 379, 389 (2009) ("[S]anctions were successfully imposed 
based on Article XXI and United Nations Security Council authorisation, for gross violations of human 
rights in the territory."). See S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. SIRES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977); S.C. Res. 569, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/569 (Jul. 26, 1985). 
106 See Marrakesh Agreement, Art. IX:3-5. Waivers require the approval of at least three fourths of 
the WTO membership. Marrakesh Agreement, Art. IX:3. 
107 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassionor Superiority Complex? What to Make of the WTO 
Waiver for 'Conflict Diamonds', 24 MICH. J. INT'tL L. 1177 (2003). 
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ments featuring a developed and a developing country; the inclusion alongside 
human rights obligations of certain provisions, such as TRIPS-plus intellectual 
property provisions that may conflict with human rights objectives; and the trend 
towards FTAs that will largely exclude developing countries and their interests. 
The data is more convincing with respect to a linkage between WTO membership 
and an improvement in human rights. In addition, the WTO provides a more 
conducive forum than FTAs for developing countries to have a voice in the poli-
cies that affect them. There is policy space within the WTO for developed coun-
tries to adopt policies to encourage developing countries to adhere to human 
rights obligations, but at the same time, allow the developing countries to express 
their own views on these issues. As such, those interested in promoting human 
rights in developing countries should focus less on pushing human rights obliga-
tions in FTAs and more on bringing countries into the WTO and working therein 
to effect agreements that will help the economies - and in conjunction the human 
rights records - of developing countries. 
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